
The parallels are uncanny. In 9 AD, three Roman legions under the command of one Publius Quinctilius Varus were gadding about in the dark forests of the Central European back country, fully convinced of their unassailable military dominance when to their unimaginable chagrin, one Arminius, a Germanic Cherusci tribesman with a band of barbarians laid claim to what was to become the greatest defeat of the Roman empire until then.
Such was the hubris of all things Rome, Varus had been appointed as governor (thus military leader) of this area even though his was a purely political background (and being married to a relative of Augustus helped him along) – he knew almost nothing of warfare – a lack of professional military experience that brings to mind the current US DOD secretary. Varus’ only military experience had been his tenure as governor of Syria, which proved to be sadly lacking when he was faced with a determined enemy who was familiar with Roman military tactics – a situation comparable to Hegseth’s minimal tactical aptitude. Rome had been in the business of annexing places far and wide in order to avail the empire of resources and tax income from places the empire did not know very well. After all, that’s what empires did and still do to this day.
As Rome flourished, building a vast network of roads and aqueducts, similar to but much more useful than today’s data centers being built all around the current empire, the leadership, in a similar vein of arrogance, (Augustus) apparently felt that if he personally liked someone, that was all the necessary requirement for a fit into any governmental position, so there was the invariable posting of unqualified people in positions that should have required a great deal of expertise. Sound familiar? This lack of military prowess on the part of Varus came back to haunt Rome in a big way. This should be expected when an unqualified military group, depleted of experienced generals and admirals, led by a political hack who had very little military experience in leadership position starts a war against a very capable enemy who has spent years studying strategy in anticipation of such an attack.
Varus manned up his three legions went on a march across Europe, supposedly to consolidate Roman rule in Germania and remind the barbarian tribes of the taxes they were supposed to be paying to Rome, but by that time Arminius had deftly planned his strategy by having visited all the affected tribal leaders in order to bring them under the same rebellious umbrella. Arminius had also served for a time in the Roman army, so he had acquired some degree of familiarity with Roman battle tactics. None of the Iranian military leaders have served in the US or Israeli militaries, but with today’s communications and intelligence capabilities, familiarity with US and Israeli tactics has doubtless been gained as much or more than Armenius did with his service to Rome. Nort everyone is aware that when those great armies marched across the countryside, they invariably amassed a following of all kinds of civilians, men and women who followed the legions to aid the armies by providing food and other logistics from which they might receive some profit, so there were probably as many civilians following along as there were legionnaires. All in all it was a big circus, designed to instill awe in any potential rebellious groups by show of arms and soldiers, and simply from their presence, the implied support of the populace.
Arminius had developed a plan of attack, but for it to work, he needed to lure Varus into taking a route through the Teutoburg Forest that he hadn’t planned on taking. Varus planted a rumor of a Germanic uprising in the area that got to Varus, along with an urgent suggestion that Varus take his armies and go there to quell it, which he did. In their turn, Iran developed a plan in which they identified critical targets on American bases in the Middle East which were to be attacked, starting with the expensive and crucial radar systems that would prohibit Iranian missile attacks, or at least would no longer be able to give warning of their launches. The point here is that a determined enemy of an overconfident empire spend enormous effort developing unexpected strategies with which they might defeat their vastly superior foes.
Without going into a lot of detail, suffice it to say that using tactics studied over the years and superior knowledge of the terrain, Arminius’ barbarian tribes soundly defeated the armies of the Roman empire at Teutoburg, much like the Iranians with their missile and drone arsenals and superior planning did to the American military with its depleted ranks of generals. so far it seems that the US Centcom commander, this Cooper guy is at least as inept as his boss Hegseth and his boss Trump. Well, at least in everything but lying, but unfortunately lying does not win wars. Just as Arminius’ and his barbarian hordes did to an empire many centuries ago, the IRGC has thoroughly trounced a vastly outmatched today’s army of empire, the biggest difference I can see is that as opposed to Rome, the US empire’s leadership is taking much longer to understand it has been whipped and so continues to lose assets. But with all the good flag officers gone, so what can be expected? Stalin, anyone?
So a great military power prowls far away from home and an inferior foe with inexpensive but effective weaponry painstakingly develops a plan to defeat them. The battle of Teutoburg Forest proved to be a decisive defeat for Rome at the hands of an underequipped (but strategically superior) group of barbarians, and the much-hyped and ballyhooed US military got slapped by a brave and determined Iranian military. In both cases the army of empire chose battle in a place where they should not have been and went up against a lesser equipped, but far more motivated enemy. We Americans wonder now what it’s going to take for the leadership to pack up and go home.
Pray for peace.

MK
